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In 2009 I attempted to carry out the research component of my MSc in the refugee camps at Dadaab, having developed an intense interest in the situation there, during the course of my studies. Unfortunately, my plans to carry out livelihoods research in the camps were thwarted because the abduction of aid-workers had triggered tightened security. All expatriate workers were confined to a fortified compound and were unable to access the camps so it was impossible to carry out the proposed research. Naturally, I was extremely disappointed having energetically researched the conditions of chronic instability that exist throughout the Horn of Africa with a special focus on the displacement of Somalis across the border into North-eastern Kenya.

I returned this year to Kenya to follow up on my ambition to work with Somali refugees in Dadaab. Voices of Africa had planned to visit to camps this week to conduct a site survey and consult with aid agencies about prospective areas for collaboration and discuss with refugees’ how their information needs might best be addressed (see Blogpost: Dadaab Refugee Camp: Information and Communications Needs).  As most readers will be aware, the security situation at Dadaab and throughout the Kenya/Somalia border region has deteriorated. A spate of kidnappings (and one murder) of foreign nationals has led to heightened security concerns. Most recently, two Spanish logisticians from Medecins Sans Frontieres were abducted inside the Dadaab refugee camp complex and taken into Somalia; their Kenyan driver was shot and injured.



The Kenyan government has responded to this activity in unprecedented fashion by sending its military into Somalia with the objectives of clearing the border area of al-Shabaab militants and, hopefully, recovering the kidnapped MSF-workers safely. But, as one BBC article pointed out, the border area is “plagued by guns and Somali bandits […] blaming al-Shabaab could be jumping to a convenient conclusion.”  Indeed the Kenya/Somalia border and much of the arid and semi-arid lands of the Horn of Africa constitute a de facto stateless zone with little or no public service provision, poor border control and the presence of a multiplicity of armed groups. Inter-communal cattle-raiding is not uncommon and is often violent, there is extensive criminal activity and numerous extra-state militant groups and secessionist movements operate within the area.



Conventional notions of statehood and sovereignty poorly describe the reality on the ground in marginal areas of the Horn. Clearly, the current Kenya/Somalia situation is not a typical interstate conflict; nor is it civil war. Indeed it is difficult to conveniently define the nature of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. Kenyan troops are cooperating with Somalia’s ‘Western-backed’ transitional government’s troops against a common enemy: al-Shabaab. Yet, it has been correctly pointed out that there is no solid evidence to suggest that al-Shabaab are responsible for the abductions and one might argue that the Kenyan military is merely provoking al-Shabaab and increasing the likelihood that terrorist attacks will be carried out on Kenyan soil (Since the time of writing, three attacks have occurred in Kenya, two in Nairobi and one in Mandera. One suspect claiming links to al-Shabaab has been apprehended).

Kenya’s decision to intervene militarily was likely influenced by many factors and the support of Western powers (including France and the USA) with an interest controlling or neutralising al-Shabaab’s activity (or at least confining it to Somalia) can be assumed to have been an important factor.

Al-Shabaab, having denied responsibility for the abductions, quickly responded to Kenya’s military intervention by rallying the Somali people to stand firm against ‘the enemy’: “Get out of your homes and defend your dignity and religion. Today is the day to defend against the enemy,”. Of the Kenyan troops, an al-Shabaab spokesman said, “Mujahudeen fighters will force them to taste the pain of the bullets” . These are far from empty threats; al-Shabaab is a hardline Islamist group with absolute belief in its cause, extensive combat experience and knowledge of the land. Despite reports that al-Shabaab has become fragmented, the Kenyan troops can expect to encounter intense resistance; prior military interventions by the USA and Ethiopia have proved almost entirely ineffective. It seems likely that extremist elements, whether officially linked to al-Shabaab or not, will continue to carry out attacks on civilian targets inside Kenya.

In light of this, one might argue that Kenya’s military intervention is ill-advised. However, it is important to take a broad view of the situation. Critically, in the past twenty years, there has been no appreciable progress in resolving the underlying causes of armed conflict in Somalia. Enormous amounts of funding have flowed into the region yet most of it is directed towards humanitarian relief efforts, rather than longer-term programming aimed at providing conditions of stability in which individuals can pursue their (enshrined but impotent) Right to development which states that:

“development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the wellbeing of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom”

UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986)

Evidently Somalis inside Somalia and refugees at Dadaab are not afforded this right. The sticking plaster approach to international aid in the Horn of Africa has not alleviated the conditions of chronic suffering and instability that have plagued the region for decades. Present-day Somalia epitomises the categorical failure of the international community to foster stability in the Horn. Therefore, one might reflect favourably on Kenya’s military intervention: it is one of the boldest moves in recent times to restore at least a modicum of stability in Somalia which has come to symbolise anarchy in the modern international system. The Somali conflict has been one of the bloodiest and more endurant wars in recent history and few would disagree that some kind of external intervention is required to set Somalia on a new course to peace and development. Importantly, the autonomy of existing emergent polities in Somaliland and Puntland should be recognised by the international community as part of any internationally-mediated peace process in Somalia.

 

Though it may be exaggerated by the Kenyan authorities, the contention that the presence of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in North-eastern province represents a security concern does have some validity; notions of ‘failed-state contagion’ seem applicable and research has revealed a link between refugee flows and insecurity: in some cases, refugees can be a cause and well as a consequence of war (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). The recent kidnappings of Westerners merely served to emphasise the real and imminent danger of Somalia’s instability leaking into Kenyan territory. Kenya has been quick and decisive in its response.  Though refugees may increase insecurity, it is important to appreciate that the marginal, arid and semi-arid lands of northern Kenya experience their own indigenous instability and armed violence. The distinctions drawn between different conflicts and different groups of people in need of humanitarian assistance merely serve to complicate the international community’s response to suffering.

 

There are many international NGOs and UN agencies inside Dadaab, striving to provide for the camp residents, many of whom remain destitute. Many families suffer from material privation, insufficient nutrition and both physical and mental health problems. To be clear, I do not wish to criticise the efforts of these agencies to provide much-needed life-saving assistance. My critique is of the over-bureaucratized, selective and inefficient apparatus of the international community which has experienced limited success in resolving conflicts and creating stability in recent years. Implementing NGOs act within the constraints of this immensely complex system which is influenced by global and regional geopolitics. Conflict and post-conflict situations often prove intractable because the political will does not exist to find a lasting solution. Somalia surely represents the clearest example of a nation which has been all but abandoned by the world community as its civilians endure suffering that is unimaginable to most in the global north. Somalia is the archetypal ‘collapsed state’, in the vernacular of the popular ‘state failure’ paradigm. The language of this academic paradigm has infiltrated the mainstream media and it is common to hear of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states. Yet, what use is this type of conceptualisation if it does not inform policy? Surely logic dictates that when a state ‘fails’, proving unwilling or unable to provide for its citizens (and especially when armed conflict affects the human security of civilians) ‘failure’ should be used as justification for intervention. Yet this is far from the picture one observes in the sphere of current affairs. International intervention, especially decisive military intervention, is reserved for special cases and is clearly not reflective of relative need. Powerful nations primarily pick their fights based on self-interest; claims to the contrary are generally evasive or delusional. Yes, there have been cases of ‘military humanitarianism’ but they by no means reflect the extent and distribution of the most acute humanitarian crises. NATO (led by the USA) undertook a decisive intervention in Kosovo in 1999, where approximately 15,000 Kosovo Albanians had been killed during ethnic cleansing; five years earlier, Clinton’s administration stood by as genocide claimed the lives of an estimated 800,000 people in Rwanda.

 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the recent Kenyan intervention can also be explained by self-interest. Kenya’s interest is not with the tragic plight of the Somali people, whose society has been ravaged by 20 years of bloody civil war; their interest is with preserving Kenya’s territorial integrity, national security and, importantly, the tourist industry which is central to plans to achieve 10% economic growth by 2015. Even if peace was reached in Somalia, it would take many years for population movements to reflect that reality and the Kenyan authorities are acutely aware of this. Clearly keeping the Somali conflict at bay is now of the utmost importance: since independence, this is easily the largest operation by Kenya’s inexperienced armed forces. Despite the inevitable self-interest, one might argue that the Kenyan government is currently doing more to resolve the causes of the conflict in Somalia than most other nations. Ultimately and realistically, conflict resolution and the cessation of violence in Somalia will be necessary precursors to alleviating the suffering of Somali civilians inside Somalia and refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and elsewhere. The international refugee regime essentially only treats the symptoms of the conflict, while the underlying causes continue to rage inside Somalia. So, one might contend that the Kenyan military, at least, is attempting to take responsibility and address those underlying causes.

 

While news reports are principally concerned with analysis of Kenya’s military intervention and al-Shabaab’s response at present, there has also been coverage of the fact that aid agencies have suspended all but life-saving assistance inside Dadaab. The security situation is preventing VOA from reaching the camps to establish the DadaabNet pilot. The same insecurity draws attention to why VOA’s work is both important and urgent. A convenient example of how DadaabNet might contribute is the provision of a frontline SMS service which would allow UNHCR and other agencies to communicate important information to the refugee population when insecurity restricts the movement of NGO-staff. Equally, important is the refugees’ ability to communicate vital information to the assisting agencies and their families and friends both inside and outside the camps. Furthermore, the DadaabNet project has the potential to facilitate the production and distribution of video content by camp residents, to convey their situation to the outside world, via the internet. VOA aims to help change the nature of the media content that comes out of Dadaab by empowering people to create and share their own stories. A more textured, personal and representative account of events in Dadaab might inspire media consumers to reconsider their perceptions about the plight of Somali refugees and the reality of chronic insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Those media-consumers may then consider raising awareness and exercising political pressure on their governments to play a more active role in resolving the current crisis. It is staring every analyst in the face that something needs to change in the approach to conflict resolution in Somalia; let us hope that Kenya’s military intervention can restore peace and lay the foundations for recovery.

For now, at least, I have to accept that I will not be going to Dadaab in the immediate future. But my interest in the plight of refugees and the violence and environmental hardship that drove them from their homes remains undiminished. My thoughts, as always, remain with the millions of human beings that continue to suffer the effects of poor governance, violent conflict and environmental instability in the Horn of Africa where the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation continues to unfold.